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1 Introduction 
In large open networks like the internet an 
increasing demand for security is observed. In order 
to establish a confidential channel between two users 
of such a network, classical single-key cryptography 
requires them to exchange a common secret key over 
a secure channel. This may work if the network is 
small and local, but it is infeasible in non-local or 
large networks. To simplify the key exchange 
problem, modern public-key cryptography provides a 
mechanism in which the keys to be exchanged do not 
need to be secret. In such a framework, every user 
possesses a key pair consisting of a (non-secret) 
public key and a (secret) private key; only public 
keys are published. They are used to encrypt the 
messages to be sent to the owner of the key or to 
verify digital signatures issued by the owner of the 
key. Before using someone else’s public key to 
encrypt a message or verify a signature, one should 
make sure that the key really belongs to the intended 
recipient or the indicated issuer of the signature. 
Achieving authenticity of public keys can be done in 
several ways. Public key cryptosystems are essential 
for electronic commerce or electronic banking 
transactions; they assure privacy as well as integrity 
of the transactions between two parties. Digital 
signatures are used to sign electronic documents and 
they are also mostly based on public-key techniques. 
 
A lot of popular public-key encryption systems 
are based on number-theoretic problems such as 
factoring integers or finding discrete logarithms. The 
underlying algebraic structures are, very often, 
abelian groups; this is especially true in the case of 
the Diffie-Hellman method (DH, see [1]), that was 
the first practical public key technique and 
introduced in 1976. In such a system, when two 
parties want to communicate with each other, the 
sender encrypts the message with the recipient‘s 
public key and then transmits the cipher text to the 
recipient. Upon receiving the encrypted information, 
the recipient can decrypt the message with his 
private key. 
 
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP, see  
[4, 6, 8]) is, together with the Integer Factoring 
Problem (IFP, see [14]) and the Elliptic Curve DLP 
(ECDLP, see [11]), one of the main problems upon 
which public-key cryptosystems are built. Thus, 
efficiently computable groups where the DLP is hard 
to break, are very important in cryptography. In 
recent years, cryptographic research has become 
more and more important due to the increasing 
number of application areas related to the field, 
requiring data confidentiality, authentication and 
integrity. 
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The method presented in this paper, generalises 
the DH approach to a group based on the powers of a 
block upper triangular matrix, which is a very 
flexible technique. 
 
The usual sizes for the keys in the IFP or DLP 
are around 1024 binary digits, existing well known 
algorithms of sub-exponential order that solve these 
problems (see [5, 12, 13]).  
 
Our system is capable of increasing the 
computational cost required for a successful attack 
on the generated DLP for equivalent key sizes. 
 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows:  
section 2 shows some properties necessary for the 
proposed cryptosystem. Section 3 is divided in 
several subsections: a key exchange protocol, an 
encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. 
Finally, several conclusions about the system are 
given in section 4. 
 
 
2 Preliminaries 
Some basic linear algebra properties, necessary 
for the purpose of the paper, are presented in this 
section. 
 
Given p a prime number and ,r s∈? , we denote 
by ( )r s pMat × Z  the matrices of size r s× , with 
elements in pZ , and by ( )r pGL Z  and ( )s pGL Z  
the invertible matrices of size r r×  and s s× . 
 
We define 
 
 
 
 
Theorem 1 The set θ  has a structure of non-abelian 
group for the product of matrices. 
 
Proof: Given the definition of θ , it is obvious that 
the product operation is closed. 
 
The identity element is  
 r
s
I
I
I
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
0
0
, 
where rI  and sI , are respectively the identity 
matrices  r r×  and  s s× . 
The inverse of any element  
A X
M
B
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0
,  is 
 
 
1 1 1
1
1
A A XB
M
B
− − −
−
−
⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0
. 
 
The associative property is obvious since they are 
square matrices. 
⁪ 
Theorem 2 Let 
A X
M
B
θ⎡ ⎤= ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0 , we consider  
the subgroup generated by the different powers of M. 
 
Taking h as a non negative integer then 
 
 
( )h h
h
h
A X
M
B
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0
, (1) 
where 
  ( ) 1
1
0,
1.
h h
h i i
i
if h
X
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=
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 (2) 
 
Also, if 0 ,t h≤ ≤  then 
 
 thtthth BXXAX −− += )()()( , (3) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )h h t h h t tX A X X B− −= + . (4) 
 
Proof: The equation (1) is proven using induction on 
h. For 0h −  and 1h − , the result is obvious. It is 
supposed to be true for 1h −  and will be 
demonstrated true for h. 
 
We have 
 
1
1 ( 1) ( )
1
( 1) 1
,
h h
h h h h
h h
h h h
h
M MM
A X A X
B B
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−
− −
−
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0
 
from the induction hypothesis, applying (2) we have 
that 
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obtaining the same expression as in (2). 
 
Also, if  ht ≤≤0 , we have  
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Comparing this result to (1) we obtain (3). 
Expression (4) is proven in the same way. 
⁪ 
As a consequence, in the case 1t = we have 
 ( ) ( 1) 1h h hX AX XB− −= + ,  
 ( ) 1 ( 1)h h hX A X X B− −= + , 
and, taking a, b integers such as 0a b+ ≥ , we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .a b a b a bX A X X B+ = +  (5) 
 
Given M θ∈ , it is known (see [9]) that  
o(M) = lcm(o(A), o(B)), on the other hand, the way to 
obtain a maximum o(M) is shown in [3, 7]. Let 
 
2 1
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−
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be two primitive polynomials in [ ]p xZ , and ,A B the 
corresponding associated matrices; let P, Q be two 
invertible matrices, 1−= PAPA  and 1−= QBQB . 
 
With this construction, the order of M is 
( ) ( 1, 1),r so M lcm p p= − −  
this number will be maximum if we take r and s 
prime (see [10]). 
 
In table 1, where the value that appears in the 
column o(M) represents the number of decimal digits 
(the integer 2128 has 39 digits), it can be observed 
that the values of r and s do not need to be very big 
to optimise the order.  
 
Table 1. Order of M, for different values of p, r and s 
p r s Digits    p r s Digits 
3 32 31 30  19 16 19 39 
 48 47 39   32 31 57 
 64 63 47   64 63 98 
5 32 31 38  31 16 15 40 
 30 33 39   32 31 64 
 64 63 61   64 63 111 
7 24 27 39  251 12 13 46 
 32 31 43   32 31 76 
 64 63 70   64 63 168 
11 22 21 39  257 9 10 40 
 32 31 50   32 31 93 
 64 63 67   64 63 169 
 
It is easy to reduce a general DLP in a cyclic 
group (with order ( )o M ) whose factorization is 
known. It is very important in the election of the 
group that the order is prime or at least with very big 
prime factors. So if ( )o M  is a prime number, it will 
require on the order of ( )o M  operations to 
compute the discrete logarithm in group θ . 
 
Theorem 3 Given M θ∈ , with order m, we have  
that ( 1) ( 1)h m hX X+ + += , with 0 1h m≤ ≤ − . 
 
Proof: We have that mM I= , as a consequence 
 
1 ( 1)
1
1 ,
m m
m
m
A X
M M
B
+ +
+
+
⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0
 (6) 
then 
 
( ) (0)
( 1) (1)
1
1
,
,
,
.
m
m
m
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X X
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B B
+
+
+
= =
= =
=
=
0
  
 
It is proven using induction on n. 
 
For 0n =  we have 
 ( 1) (1)mX X+ = . 
 
We suppose that it is true for 1h − , that is 
 ( 1 1) ( )h m hX X− + + = , 
and we have 
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 
Given  M θ∈ , and the set 
 { }(0) (1) (2) ( 1), , ,....., mG X X X X −= , 
we define the operator  ,⊗   for    a pair 
( ) ( ), ,a bX X G∈  as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )a b jX X X⊗ = , 
with (mod )j a b m= + . 
 
Theorem 4 The set G is an  abelian  group for the 
operator ⊗ . 
 
Proof: Given the definition of G and the operator 
⊗ , it is evident that it is an internal operation. 
 
Taking a  a non negative integer, the identity 
element is (0)X  as 
 ( ) (0) ( ) 0 ( ) ( )a a a a a aX X A X B A X X⊗ = + = + =0 0 , 
and 
 (0) ( ) ( ) 0 ( )a a a aX X A X B X⊗ = + =0 . 
 
Note that  
 (0)X = 0  
and that 
 0 0B A I= = . 
 
The inverse of any element ( )aX  is ( )m aX −  
as, by definition, 
 
( ) ( ) (0)
( ) ( ) (0)
,
,
a m a
m a a
X X X
X X X
−
−
⊗ =
⊗ = , 
 ( ) ( ) (0) ( ) ( )m a a m a a m a aX X X A X X B− − −⊗ = = + , 
 
and the inverse of  (0)X  is the same matrix. 
 
It validates the associative property as 
1
2
3
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ),
ja b c c
j
ja
a b c
X X X X X
X
X X
X X X
⊗ ⊗ = ⊗
=
= ⊗
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with 
 
1
2 1
3
( ) mod ,
( ) mod ( ) mod ,
( ) mod .
j a b m
j j c m a b c m
j b c m
= +
= + = + +
= +
 
 
 
 
3 The algorithms. 
 
 
3.1 Key exchange protocol 
We will see now the proposed system of block 
matrices applied to the DH key exchange protocol. 
 
Let U and V be two interlocutors who wish to 
exchange a key, then 
 
1. U and V agree on  p, M 
2. U randomly generates a private key k1, with 
11 k m≤ ≤ , and computes 
 
1 1
1
1
( )k k
k
k
A X
M
B
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0
. 
3. V randomly generates a private key  k2, with 
21 k m≤ ≤ , and computes 
 
2 2
2
2
( )k k
k
k
A X
M
B
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0
. 
4. The public key of U and V are respectively 
1 1( )( , )k kX B  and 2 2( )( , )k kX B . 
5. U computes 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )k k k k k kX A X X B+ = + . 
6. V computes 2 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( )k k k k k kX A X X B+ = + . 
 
In this way, the key shared by U and V is 
 1 2 2 1( ) ( )k k k kP X X+ += = , 
now both interlocutors, share a common and secret 
element. 
 
An attacker could know p and M, but to obtain 
the shared secret would have to face a problem with 
a complexity similar to that of the DLP (see [6]). 
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3.2 Data encryption 
We have to start from the same public and 
private elements seen previously in the key exchange 
protocol (which we suppose already done). 
 
The interlocutor U wishes to, privately, send a 
message to V. The message must be coded as a 
matrix  ( )hX GΔ = ∈ . 
 
Encryption: 
 
1. U builds the matrices 
 
1
2
,
,
A
T
B
A P
T
B
Δ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
0
0
 
   
that are invertible since A and B are 
invertible too. 
2. U computes matrix 1 2C TT=  and sends this 
matrix to V. 
 
Decryption: 
 
1. V generates the matrix 
 2
A P
T
B
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦0   
and computes its inverse. 
2. V obtains 1T  carrying out the product
1
2CT
− . 
3. V recovers the message Δ  selecting, the 
respective block of  1T . 
 
With this, the functions of encryption and 
decryption of the interlocutor V would be 
respectively 
 
1. 
2
1 2( )kE TTΔ = . 
2. 
2
1
2 1( )kD C CT T
−= = . 
 
With the appropriate quick exponentiation 
algorithms (see [2]), the elements of G and the 
powers of A and B can be computed efficiently. 
 
The complexity of the problem that an attacker 
would face is in the order of that of the DLP, acting, 
in effect, as a deterrent for a possible attack. 
 
 
3.3 Signature scheme 
We propose a digital signature scheme that 
requires the original message in order to verify the 
signature. 
 
The scheme, that follows, is based on the 
ElGamal (see [15]) digital signature scheme. 
 
We suppose that the users U and V have 
exchanged the key P, and U has sent the message Δ  
to V, according to the previous protocol. If the 
transmitter U wishes to sign digitally the message Δ  
proceeds in the following way 
 
1. U generates a random number w. 
2. U  computes wH B=  and ( )wX . 
3. U  computes  
  1 1 1( ) ( )( )k w k kw wJ X A X X B+= = + . 
4. U  computes  1 2(( ) )k w kT X + += Δ −  where  
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
(( ) ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k w k k w k k w k
k k k w kw
X A X X B
A A X X B
+ + + +
+
= +
= +
 
 
That is to say, in order to compute T it 
is necessary to obtain 1kA and ,wA  which are 
private keys of the sender U, it is also 
necessary 2( )kX and 2( )kB , which are public 
keys of the receiver V  and 1( )k wX + , which 
can be obtained from the data accessible to  
U. 
5. The digital signature is ( , , )H J T . 
 
If the receiver wishes to verify the digital 
signature of U, he proceeds in the following way 
 
1. V computes 
 
  
1 2 2 1
2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
(( ) ) ( ( ))
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k w k k k w
k k w k k w
k k w k k w
X X
A X X B
A X X B B
+ + + +
+ +
+
=
= +
= +
 
 
Note that all the necessary elements for 
this calculation are public keys, elements of 
the digital signature or private keys of V 
2. V computes 2 1( ( )) .k k wY X + += Δ −  
3. V compares Δ  and Y , turning out to be an 
authentic signature if YΔ = and false if 
YΔ ≠ . 
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4. Conclusions 
With the aim of creating systems that allow to 
increase the computational cost required to break  
certain well known problems, we have presented a 
public key cryptosystem based on a generalization of 
the DLP for block upper triangular matrices, which 
provides an efficient protection against common 
attacks without the need of bigger key sizes. 
 
For the development of this cryptosystem we 
have defined a set of matrices G that with an 
operator ⊗  form an abelian group, necessary for the 
definition of the key exchange protocol, public key 
cryptosystem and digital signature scheme. 
 
Given two parties U and V, the key exchange 
protocol guarantees that both parties share a secret 
element of G; the public key cryptosystem defined 
assures data confidentiality and the digital signature 
scheme guarantees authentication and integrity. 
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